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Abstract
Background: The AMNOG regulation, introduced in 2011 in Germany, changed the game for new drugs. Now, the
industry is required to submit a dossier to the GBA (the central decision body in the German sickness fund system)
to show additional benefit. After granting the magnitude of the additional benefit by the GBA, the manufacturer is
entitled to negotiate the reimbursement price with the GKV-SV (National Association of Statutory Health Insurance
Funds). The reimbursement price is defined as a discount on the drug price at launch. As the price or discount
negotiations between the manufacturers and the GKV-SV takes place behind closed doors, the factors influencing
the results of the negotiation are not known.
Objectives: The aim of this evaluation is to identify factors influencing the results of the AMNOG price negotiation
process.
Methods: The analysis was based on a dataset containing detailed information on all assessments until the end of
2015. A descriptive analysis was followed by an econometric analysis of various potential factors (benefit rating, size
of target population, deviating from appropriate comparative therapy and incorporation of HRQoL-data).
Results: Until December 2015, manufacturers and the GKV-SV finalized 96 negotiations in 193 therapeutic areas,
based on assessment conducted by the GBA. The GBA has granted an additional benefit to 100/193 drug
innovations. Negotiated discount was significantly higher for those drugs without additional benefit (p = 0.030) and
non-orphan drugs (p = 0.015). Smaller population size, no deviation from recommended appropriate comparative
therapy and the incorporation of HRQoL-data were associated with a lower discount on the price at launch.
However, neither a uni- nor the multivariate linear regression showed enough power to predict the final discount.
Conclusions: Although the AMNOG regulation implemented binding and strict rules for the benefit assessment
itself, the outcome of the discount negotiations are still unpredictable. Obviously, negotiation tactics, the current
political situation and soft factors seem to play a more influential role for the outcome of the negotiations than the
five hard and known factors analyzed in this study. Further research is needed to evaluate additional factors.
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Background
The Act on the Reform of the Market for Medical Prod-
ucts (Arzneimittelmarkt-Neuordnungsgesetz, AMNOG)
became effective in 2011. Upon market registration,
pharmaceutical companies are obliged by law to submit
a dossier to the Federal Joint Committee (Gemeinsamer
Bundesausschuss, GBA) in order to prove a patient-
relevant medical benefit in mortality, morbidity, and
health-related quality of life (HRQoL). The GBA is the
decision-making body of the joint self-governing board
of stakeholders in healthcare (physicians, dentists, hospi-
tals and sickness funds) in the German Statutory Health
Insurance (Gesetzliche Krankenversicherung, GKV). The
methodological basis of the underlying assessment and
the uncertainties regarding outcomes and study results is
in accordance with the principles of evidence-based medi-
cine. The Institute for Quality and Efficiency in Health
Care (Institut für Qualität und Wirtschaftlichkeit im
Gesundheitswesen, IQWiG) publishes its own methods on
assessments in a specific method paper including key ele-
ments on how assessments are to be carried out [1].
A ruling on additional benefit for a specific compound
by the GBA (appraisal) is based on the overall assessment
of the evidence presented in the dossier for effects on
mortality, morbidity, and HRQoL. Besides a rating based
on self-assessment by the manufacturer when the dossier
is submitted, an assessment from the IQWiG and/or the
GBA is vital for the final benefit rating [2]. Sometimes a
manufacturer decides not to submit a dossier and accepts
a rating of no additional benefit from the beginning.
As mentioned, the acknowledgement of a patient-
relevant medical benefit by the GBA is crucial. An inde-
pendent assessment of the evidence by the IQWiG
supports the decision by the GBA. As an institution, des-
ignated by law, IQWiG supports the GBA with providing
independent, evidence-based expert reports. IQWiG sub-
mits the results of their assessment to the GBA with a rec-
ommendation regarding the additional patient-relevant
benefit of the investigated drug. Overall, the GBA decision
is based on the manufacturers’ dossier and submitted data,
the IQWiG evaluation, as well as the results of the public
hearing as part of the commenting procedure.
The following categories define the magnitude of add-
itional benefit: (1) major, (2) considerable, (3) minor, (4)
non-quantifiable, (5) no additional benefit, or (6) less
benefit. The number and characteristics of studies pro-
vided, the certainty of results, and the observed effects
determine the level or quality of evidence (‘proof ’, ‘indi-
cation’ or ‘hint’) [3]. The GBA decides about the add-
itional benefit of a new compound compared to the
appropriate comparative therapy (ACT) usually named
within the scientific advice. The final decision on the
ACT is taken by the GBA when deciding on the added
benefit ultimately.
Price negotiations begin after a final decision on the
(additional) medical benefit, announced by the GBA. The
negotiation procedure contains mainly the negotiation of a
discount on the published list price in addition to already
existing mandatory discounts in accordance with §130a of
the 5th Social Law Book. Representatives of the manufac-
turer negotiate the price with representatives of the Na-
tional Association of Statutory Health Insurance Funds
(Spitzenverband Bund der Krankenkassen, GKV-SV). The
negotiations have to be finalized within 6 months after
market access. In case that no final agreement is achieved
on price discount after an additional 6 months, an arbitra-
tion will be initiated. During a 3-month timeframe, an offi-
cial arbitration board will set the final price decision.
Companies are free to set the price for the first 12 months
after market launch, the negotiated (or arbitrated) discount
becomes effective immediately after this first year [4].
Until now, no published analyses have been conducted
addressing factors that might influence the magnitude of a
discount. Therefore, the aim of this evaluation was to iden-
tify potential factors influencing final negotiated discounts.
Methods
Conceptual framework and analytic strategy
Based on the “hunches of experts”, we have identified
several factors, which might influence the final discount.
Factors influencing the negotiated discount on the price
of a new drug are many and we had to be selective in
this study to ensure that the analysis is significant. Five
potential influencing factors were scoped in our analysis,
which are assumed as most relevant:
1. Rating (as the result of the benefit assessment)
2. Indication class
3. Orphan drug status (also reflected by size of target
population)
4. ACT (depending on number and annual costs)
5. HRQoL data (when incorporated in the assessment).
Data sources
The underlying dataset contains all dossiers with benefit
ratings published and negotiated until December 31st,
2015. Excluding those admitted to a reference price
group or choosing opt-out, all benefit assessments were
analyzed with respect to these factors and their impact
on negotiated discounts. Besides these factors, other po-
tential differentiators were scoped.
For this analysis, we evaluated the discount per thera-
peutic area assessed. It has to be noted, that one new
drug might have been subject to one or more assess-
ments, for instance after a label extension, requiring a
reassessment and/or the need to split up a single process
in one or more therapeutic areas (e.g. the usual number
of therapeutic areas in diabetes is five).
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The basis for calculation of discounts were price infor-
mation published by the official Germany drug price list
(“Lauertaxe”). Prices and discounts for the time at start
of negotiations and end of negotiations were gathered
and used for the analysis. Label extensions might change
the price and negotiated discounts. In that case, we con-
sidered the latest discount update.
Statistical analysis
We analyzed the data in a two-step approach with IBM
SPSS Statistics 23. First, to describe this comprehensive
data sample with respect to the assumed potential influ-
ence factors, we report quantitative variables, e.g. mean,
standard deviation, minimum and maximum.
Second, based on our description, we derived some hy-
potheses on what influences the price. Hereby we con-
ducted a linear regression model to analyze the impact
of these factors on the final discount. The dependent
variable in the model was the price change (discount) of
the new therapy.
The independent variables in the regression model
were as mentioned above and we decided to
1. build a univariate regression for each independent
variable,
2. build a multivariate regression model including all
variables with p < 0.05.
Results
Descriptive analysis
Manufacturers and GKV-SV finalized price negotiations
for 193 assessed therapeutic areas within 96 assessments
until December 31st, 2015. The GBA granted an add-
itional benefit for 100/193. Of these, one was major, 29
were considerable, 48 minor, and 22 non-quantifiable
additional benefit ratings. One rating was with additional
harm potential (=less benefit). Manufacturers presented
no dossier for five assessments.
Rating
The overall mean discount was 21.96 % [0–78.02; SD
13.14] on the initially freely set price at launch. The
mean discount for “no additional benefit” (n = 93) of
24.09 % [0–78.02; SD 14.19] was significantly higher
than discount for an “additional benefit” (n = 100)
19.98 % [0–58.73; SD 11.81] (p = 0.030). One assessment
resulted in a “major additional benefit” (13.64 %) and
one in “additional harm potential” (9.00 %). Overall, two
indication classes showed significant results for the
mean discount compared to the others: “Diseases of the
Respiratory System” and “Diseases of the Nervous Sys-
tem”. They present the minimum and the maximum
mean discount when comparing discounts per indica-
tion class (Tables 1 and 2).
Manufacturers’ own rating of the additional benefit
was different from the rating of the additional benefit
by IQWiG and/or GBA in 95/193 assessments and
often overestimated. An identical rating between
IQWiG and GBA (n = 95) led to an average discount of
22.14 % [0–78.02; SD 14.39] compared to a discount of
23.81 % [0–58.73; SD 13.79] in assessments without
identical rating (n = 69). When renouncing a dossier
submission (n = 5) the negotiated average discount was
31.51 % [3.97–78.02; SD 29.95] vs. 23.84 % [0–67.30;
SD 13.0] with dossier submission and the GBA granted
“no additional benefit” (n = 86).
Number of target populations assessed were more
than one in 47/96 assessments. The overall size, mea-
sured by the upper level mentioned in the GBA decision,
was n = 122,808 [6–3,253,000; SD 409,065]. For dis-
counts by size of target population see Table 3.
Orphan drug status
Mean discount for orphan drugs (29/193) was 18.31 %
[1.00–29.78; SD 7.27] compared to non-orphan drugs
(164/193) 22.60 % [0–78.02; SD 13.83] (p = 0.015). When
comparing orphan drugs only with non-orphans with
additional benefit (71/193) 20.67 % [0–58.73; SD 13.21]
the difference was not significant (p = 0.256). Table 4 pre-
sents the results per indication class and benefit category.
Appropriate comparative therapy
For orphan drugs (n = 29) the additional benefit is preset
by law independent from the chosen ACT. Table 5 shows
that for 67/164 assessments the manufacturer did not fol-
low the GBA recommendations regarding the ACT. For
83/164 assessments, more than one ACT was recom-
mended by the GBA (30 of those not following the GBA
and 53 who followed the GBA recommendation). When
comparing the annual cost of the new drug to the cheap-
est ACT recommended by the GBA, annual costs were at
least 54 % higher for those with more than one ACT.
The mean discount did not significantly differ com-
pared to those where the manufacturer followed the rec-
ommendation and no noticeable differences were seen
regarding indication groups (Table 5).
For the assessments where the manufacturer deviated
from GBA recommendation (n = 30), the manufacturer
chose the more costly ACT in 19 assessments. Annual
cost of the new compound ranged from 94–8100 % com-
pared to ACT. Mean discount was 21.72 % [10.75–43.08;
SD 6.56). In 11 assessments, the definition of subgroups
was different so that no comparison was possible.
Incorporated HRQoL-data
In 49/193 assessments, the GBA incorporated HRQol-
data in their assessment and granted an additional bene-
fit for 33 (21 of them with minor). Overall, the mean
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discount for drugs with incorporated HRQoL-data was
19.29 % [0–40.77; SD 10.93] compared to those without
incorporated HRQoL-data 22.87 % [0–78.02; SD 13.73],
p = 0.100. No significant differences were shown for dis-
counts per benefit category, indication class or drug sta-
tus (orphan/non-orphan) (Table 6).
Linear regression
The univariate regression provided significant results for
factor “Rating” and “Indication”, which significantly
correlate with the dependent variable (Appendix 1). For
the multivariate regression, we included all significant
variables. To avoid a non-inclusion of categories due to
the low number of observations, we included all benefit
categories and indication classes too. Running the
multivariate regression, two of the included variables
were excluded automatically and the variable with the
maximum mean discount (“Diseases of the nervous sys-
tem”, n = 9) was significant (Appendix 2). There were
statistically significant differences between group means
Table 1 Discounts by benefit categories and indication class
Additional benefit: overall
Indication class by ICD-10 n Mean Min Max SD
Certain infectious and parasitic diseases 51 22.01 0.00 42.54 12.00
Diseases of the blood and blood-forming organs 2 24.50 23.15 25.85 1.91
Diseases of the circulatory system 14 25.25 4.65 58.73 16.10
Diseases of the digestive system 6 27.42 14.87 31.02 6.52
Diseases of the eye and adnexa 7 19.46 3.06 78.02 26.57
Diseases of the genitourinary system 2 19.80 19.80 19.80 0.00
Diseases of the musculoskeletal system and connective tissue 1 39.44 39.44 39.44 –
Diseases of the nervous system 9 37.84 * 24.32 67.30 14.40
Diseases of the respiratory system 9 12.93 * 2.01 25.74 11.24
Diseases of the skin and subcutaneous tissue 1 42.75 42.75 42.75 –
Endocrine, nutritional and metabolic diseases 24 19.86 1.00 48.60 12.43
Mental and behavioral disorders 2 25.68 17.36 34.00 11.77
Neoplasms 57 20.01 0.00 53.71 11.16
Other 8 20.73 13.64 28.55 6.43
Overall a 193 21.96 0.00 78.02 13.14
Size of target population a (upper level) 193 122808 6 3253000 409065
Additional benefit: overall with additional benefit
Indication class by ICD-10 n Mean Min Max SD
Certain infectious and parasitic diseases 29 20.16 0.00 42.54 12.57
Diseases of the circulatory system 8 27.32 4.65 58.73 17.77
Diseases of the digestive system 2 20.21 14.87 25.54 7.54
Diseases of the eye and adnexa 1 15.43 15.43 15.43 –
Diseases of the genitourinary system 2 19.80 19.80 19.80 0.00
Diseases of the musculoskeletal system and connective tissue 1 39.44 39.44 39.44 –
Diseases of the nervous system 2 40.69 * 29.71 51.67 15.53
Diseases of the respiratory system 3 4.99 * 2.01 10.96 5.17
Endocrine, nutritional and metabolic diseases 11 14.11 1.00 25.31 7.60
Other 4 16.36 13.64 24.50 5.43
Neoplasms 37 20.09 4.74 46.44 9.66
Overall 100 19.98 0.00 58.73 11.81
Size of target population (upper level) 100 80418 6 2542810 302323
Abbreviations: Min minimum, Max maximum, SD standard deviation
All discounts presented in %
*p < 0.05 compared to mean discount of the other indications
aIncluding the assessment with major benefit
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Table 2 Discounts by benefit categories and indication class
Additional benefit: considerable
Indication class by ICD-10 n Mean Min Max SD
Certain infectious and parasitic diseases 11 23.80 10.07 42.54 13.96
Diseases of the circulatory system 1 19.35 19.35 19.35 –
Diseases of the eye and adnexa 1 15.43 15.43 15.43 –
Diseases of the musculoskeletal system and connective tissue 1 39.44 39.44 39.44 –
Endocrine, nutritional and metabolic diseases 1 5.05 5.05 5.05 –
Neoplasms 14 18.44 6.35 35.19 8.69
Overall 29 20.66 5.05 42.54 11.55
Size of target population (upper level) 29 18172 143 221000 40788
Additional benefit: minor
Indication class by ICD-10 n Mean Min Max SD
Certain infectious and parasitic diseases 12 18.48 0.00 42.54 13.78
Diseases of the circulatory system 6 29.97 4.65 58.73 20.21
Diseases of the digestive system 1 25.54 25.54 25.54 –
Diseases of the genitourinary system 2 19.80 19.80 19.80 0.00
Diseases of the nervous system 2 40.69 29.71 51.67 15.53
Diseases of the respiratory system 2 2.01 * 2.01 2.01 0.00
Endocrine, nutritional and metabolic diseases 10 15.02 1.00 25.31 7.36
Neoplasms 12 23.16 4.74 46.44 12.83
Other 1 24.50 24.50 24.50 –
Overall 48 20.93 0.00 58.73 20.16
Size of target population (upper level) 48 153723 6 2542810 425313
Additional benefit: non-quantifiable
Indication class by ICD-10 n Mean Min Max SD
Certain infectious and parasitic diseases 6 16.86 10.07 21.25 5.33
Diseases of the circulatory system 1 19.35 19.35 19.35 –
Diseases of the digestive system 1 14.87 14.87 14.87 –
Diseases of the respiratory system 1 10.96 10.96 10.96 –
Neoplasms 11 18.84 9.00 29.78 6.29
Other 2 13.64 13.64 13.64 0.00
Overall 22 17.31 * 9.00 29.778 55.32
Size of target population (upper level) 22 6081 25 34000 9994
No additional benefit
Indication class by ICD-10 n Mean Min Max SD
Certain infectious and parasitic diseases 22 24.45 3.16 42.54 11.01
Diseases of the digestive system 4 31.02 31.02 31.02 0.00
Diseases of the blood and blood-forming organs 2 24.50 23.15 25.85 1.91
Diseases of the circulatory system 6 22.49 4.65 49.52 14.69
Diseases of the eye and adnexa 6 20.13 3.06 78.02 29.04
Diseases of the nervous system 7 37.03 24.32 67.30 15.26
Diseases of the respiratory system 6 16.90 2.01 25.74 11.60
Diseases of the skin and subcutaneous tissue 1 42.75 42.75 42.75 –
Endocrine, nutritional and metabolic diseases 13 24.72 * 12.78 48.60 13.86
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(p = 0.020). The model explained 16.3 % of the
variations.
Discussion
The present study analyses possible factors influen-
cing the final negotiated discount after AMNOG-
assessment. Therefore, results of this analysis should
be interpreted as a trend and starting point for fur-
ther research.
Of the analyzed 193 assessments, 91 rated with “no
additional benefit”. This is nearly half of all assess-
ments, whereas for orphan drugs (29/193) the law
presets an additional benefit. As expected, a proven
additional benefit influences the final discount posi-
tively. However, the rating itself seems not to fully
“reflect” the expected discount. For example, 0 %
given for a rating with minor additional benefit and
78.02 % for a rating with no additional benefit. Dis-
counted prices negotiated based on the early benefit
assessment show that the new system has resulted in
substantial rebates within a wide range of results.
However, free pricing for the first year seems not to
impose a structurally negative impact [5].
The number of target populations assessed did not
show any significant differences on final discount. For
size of target population, there was only a hint that a
smaller target population leads to lower discounts.
This might reflect the circumstance that discounts for
orphan drugs were lower, compared to non-orphan
drugs.
Orphan drugs need to be treated differently due to
the circumstance that the law presets their additional
benefit. When separating orphan drugs, mean discount
for orphan drugs was not significantly different to those
with additional benefit and non-orphan drug status.
If the manufacturer does not deviate from GBA rec-
ommendations on the ACT, discounts seem to be
smaller. When deviating from recommendation, assess-
ments were granted with “no additional benefit” if no
adequate reason existed. For half of all assessments, the
GBA recommended more than one ACT. If the manu-
facturer chosed the more costly ACT, it had no signifi-
cant impact on discounts.
The acceptance and consideration of HRQoL-data
within the GBA appraisal tends to influence the final
discount positively. In the future, measured quality of
life data and other patient-reported outcomes might play
a greater role in early benefit assessment [6]. For ex-
ample, crizotinib was not able to show an improvement
of overall survival and the GBA did not analyze the
surrogate parameter progression-free survival to assess
the benefit of the drug. However, the significant
reduction in non-fatal symptoms and a significant im-
provement in quality of life led to a considerable
additional benefit ruling in comparison to best sup-
portive care [7].
Based on current evidence and chosen influence factors,
it was not possible to develop a model that reliably ex-
plains how much the discount level is expected to change
in response. With R2 = 0.163 the regression model ex-
plained only a small proportion of total variation [8]. On
Table 2 Discounts by benefit categories and indication class (Continued)
Mental and behavioral disorders 2 25.68 17.36 34.00 11.77
Neoplasms 19 20.43 0.00 53.71 13.92
Other 4 25.10 * 21.65 28.55 3.98
Overall 92 24.25 * 0.00 78.02 14.18
Size of target population (upper level) 92 170203 15 3253000 499215
Abbreviations: Min minimum, Max maximum, SD standard deviation
All discounts presented in %
Assessment with “Major Benefit” = 13.64 % (TP upper level = 2333.33)
Assessment with “Less Benefit” = 9.00 % (TP upper level = 1460)
* p < 0.05 compared to mean discount of the other indications
Table 3 Target population and discount
Overall
Size of target population n Mean Min Max SD
0–< 1000 34 20.84 1.00 53.71 12.15
1000–< 2500 38 21.28 0.00 42.54 11.53
2500–< 7500 31 19.79 4.74 39.44 9.00
7500–< 25000 32 21.61 2.01 46.44 11.43
25000–< 150000 34 23.88 3.16 67.30 15.12
150000+ 24 25.18 2.01 78.02 19.50
Orphan drugs
Size of target population n Mean Min Max SD
0–< 300 10 13.70 1.00 24.50 8.15
300–< 1500 10 20.66 9.00 29.78 6.52
1500+ 9 20.81 10.96 25.54 4.66
All discounts presented in %
Abbreviations: Min minimum, Max maximum, SD standard deviation
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the one hand, this might be a result of the limited
sample size and inter-correlation between independ-
ent variables. On the other hand, other influence factors
and/or analysis tools might be necessary to consider (e.g.
respective benchmarks introduced in the framework
agreement signed by the GKV-SV and the manufacturers’
unions [9]). This seems the fact especially when predicting
human behavior because the decision making process is
overly complex: clarifying objectives, generating alterna-
tives, define the BATNA (the “Best Alternative To Negoti-
ated Agreement”), evaluating consequences and making
tradeoffs. Some influencing factors may not be directly ob-
servable, such as the negotiation skills of the manufac-
turer, acceptance and “attitude” of the manufacturer, or
“good will” in situations of high-unmet clinical need, to
name just a few. Decisions must be made in the presence
of multiple usually conflicting and incommensurate cri-
teria or attributes, what makes a multi-criteria decision
making approach reasonable [10].
For discount calculation, we used data from the of-
ficial German drug price list “Lauertaxe” for the
largest package (N3). Often smaller packages exist or
the manufacturer decides to withdraw package sizes
from the market. In addition to the negotiated dis-
count, a manufacturer might lower the initial price
that was set at market launch at their discretion any
time before or after finalization of negotiations [11].
Regarding the prices and discounts it is important to
note, that if one product covers different therapeutic
areas with different ratings, mixed prices and/or dis-
counts exist.
When evaluating the discount by assessment level (n = 96)
the overall mean discount was 23.16 % [0–78.02 %; SD
14.66]. Hence, 92 subgroups assessed with “no additional
benefit” within 96 assessments totally changes the pic-
ture. When taken “no additional benefit” as the high-
est rating granted, the number of assessments is 29
[2, 12, 13].
The small number of observations (especially when dif-
fering by benefit categories, drug status or indication) and
the wide spread of negotiated discounts limit our analysis.
Due to the limited group size, all significant results need
to be interpreted with caution.
While the early benefit assessment and appraisal
of clinical evidence itself is a very clear and trans-
parent procedure, no official algorithm exists for a
prediction of levels of negotiated price discounts [4,
14]. This is a result of confidentiality between the
negotiation parties. Thus, a high uncertainty re-
mains due to modalities regarding setting the max-
imum reimbursable price (e.g. premium over the
price of the ACT or discount on an existing market
price of the new product) and the proceedings of
the arbitration board when negotiations fail.
Table 4 Discounts by benefit categories and indication class
(Orphan drugs)
Additional benefit: overall
Indication class by ICD-10 n Mean Min Max SD
Diseases of the respiratory
system
1 10.96 10.96 10.96 –
Diseases of the circulatory
system
3 22.31 20.72 25.49 2.75
Neoplasms 16 19.59 9.00 29.78 5.82
Other 1 24.50 24.50 24.50 –
Endocrine, nutritional and
metabolic diseases
6 12.43 1.00 25.31 10.17
Diseases of the digestive
system
2 20.21 14.87 25.54 7.54
Overall 29 18.31 1.00 29.78 7.27
Size of target population
(upper level)
29 1896 11 7850 2583
Additional benefit:
considerable
Indication class by
ICD-10
n Mean Min Max SD
Neoplasms 2 20.80 19.78 21.81 1.44
Endocrine, nutritional and
metabolic diseases
1 5.05 5.05 5.05 –
Overall 3 15.55 5.05 21.81 9.15
Size of target population
(upper level)
3 2348 143 5000 2459
Additional benefit: minor
Indication class by ICD-10 n Mean Min Max SD
Diseases of the circulatory
system
3 22.31 20.72 25.49 2.75
Neoplasms 3 21.55 13.85 25.81 6.68
Other 1 24.50 24.50 24.50 –
Endocrine, nutritional and
metabolic diseases
5 13.91 1.00 25.31 10.62
Diseases of the digestive
system
1 25.54 25.54 25.54 –
Overall 13 19.32 1.00 25.54 8.21
Size of target population
(upper level)
13 2167 11 7850 2924
Additional benefit:
non-quantifiable
Indication class by ICD-10 n Mean Min Max SD
Diseases of the respiratory
system
1 10.96 10.96 10.96 –
Neoplasms 11 18.84 9.00 29.78 6.29
Diseases of the digestive
system
1 14.87 14.87 14.87 –
Overall 13 17.93 9.00 29.78 6.21
Size of target population
(upper level)
13 1521 25 7500 2393
All discounts presented in %
Abbreviations: Min minimum, Max maximum, SD standard deviation
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Some hard criteria for the discount negotiation are
mandatory and pre-set:
 Result of the GBA-assessment
 Price as set by the manufacturer
 Annual costs of comparable therapies
That leads to the presumption that the negotiation
by itself is a “black box” with uncertain outcome and
perhaps contrary to the interests of the individuals in-
sured in the GKV [15]. This seems to be a fact, al-
though the GBA is obliged to make considerations of
economic efficiency when including a new health care
service into the service catalogue.
From an economic standpoint, there are two
approaches to explain price building for pharmaceuti-
cals and for the assessment of functionality as well
as appropriateness of negotiation criteria. The first
Table 6 Incorporated HRQoL data and discounts
Additional benefit category
Incorporated HRQoL-data
No Yes
n Mean Min Max SD n Mean Min Max SD
Overall 144 22.87 0.00 78.02 13.73 49 19.29 0.00 40.77 10.93
Overall with additional benefit 67 20.89 4.65 58.73 12.38 33 18.15 0.00 39.65 10.49
Major 1 13.64 13.64 13.64 – 0 – – – –
Considerable 19 23.02 9.99 42.54 12.00 10 16.19 5.05 39.44 9.64
Minor 27 22.73 4.65 58.73 15.70 21 18.63 0.00 39.65 11.33
Non-quantifiable 20 16.74 9.00 29.78 5.33 2 22.99 19.04 26.93 5.58
No 76 24.80 0.00 78.02 14.65 16 21.66 2.01 40.77 11.77
Additional harm potential 1 9.00 9.00 9.00 – 0 – – – –
Abbreviations: HRQoL health-related quality of life, Min minimum, Max maximum, SD standard deviation
All discounts presented in %
Table 5 Acceptance of ACT and discounts (N = 164, excl. orphan drugs)
Acceptance of ACT set by GBA: no
Additional benefit category ACT≤ 1 ACT > 1
n Mean Min Max SD n Mean Min Max SD
Overall 37 20.25 3.40 67.30 13.21 30 22.46 0.00 53.71 11.88
Overall with additional benefit 18 16.63 4.74 39.65 10.05 9 19.72 0.00 51.67 15.30
Considerable 7 18.05 10.07 32.87 7.93 4 15.06 10.07 23.15 6.29
Minor 8 16.70 4.74 39.65 13.26 5 23.45 0.00 51.67 19.99
Non-quantifiable 3 13.16 10.07 19.35 5.36 0 – – – –
No 19 20.25 3.40 67.30 13.21 21 23.63 3.16 53.71 10.30
Acceptance of ACT set by GBA: yes
Additional benefit category ACT≤ 1 ACT > 1
n Mean Min Max SD n Mean Min Max SD
Overall 44 24.14 0.00 78.02 15.22 53 23.07 2.01 58.73 14.25
Overall with additional benefit 17 23.26 6.35 35.19 12.60 27 22.05 2.01 58.73 14.69
Major 1 13.64 13.64 13.64 – 0 – – – –
Considerable 7 19.05 6.35 35.19 11.70 8 29.08 10.38 42.54 14.21
Minor 7 31.58 19.80 46.44 11.77 15 18.78 2.01 58.73 16.10
Non-quantifiable 2 13.64 13.64 13.64 0.00 4 20.25 19.25 21.25 1.15
No 27 24.69 0.00 78.02 16.86 25 24.73 2.01 49.52 13.92
Additional harm potential 0 – – – – 1 9.00 9.00 9.00 –
Abbreviations: Min minimum, Max maximum, SD standard deviation
All discounts presented in %
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approach calculates the price of a new pharmaceutical
based on research and development costs (plus X for
innovation). The second approach measures the
willingness-to-pay in dependence of patient prefer-
ences of the society (assessing the properties and ad-
vantages of a product). Pareto-optimum might be
reached when full information about preferences and
willingness-to-pay and low transaction costs exist [4].
In reality, this is only true in a very limited number
of cases. Hidden information and hidden action be-
tween market players and transaction costs are not
known.
Under highly specific assumptions, it is possible to
internalize occurring external effects with bilateral ne-
gotiations and reach pareto-efficient negotiation re-
sults. However, manufacturers do not negotiate with
patients directly. GKV-SV acts on behalf of the sick-
ness funds and representative for patients (insured
community). Physicians influence the distribution of
new drugs when prescribing drugs and there is a
need for a reserve capacity of health services that has
to be offered by the government independent of the
actual demand.
In addition, monetization of the additional benefit by
the arbitration board would also require the measure-
ment of patients’ willingness-to-pay. Preferences and the
willingness-to-pay of subjects (patients) are not known
[11, 16] and the calculation of the reimbursable price is
not able to consider this within its individual price
components: result of benefit rating, price of ACT and
undefined price if additional benefit is proven. Other un-
considered issues are incentives for innovation or opti-
mal patient access [17].
Most other European countries focus more on cost-
effectiveness approaches. For instance, the British Na-
tional Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE),
besides evaluating the “clinical effectiveness” of a new
technology, also performs cost-effectiveness assessments.
Cost-effectiveness approaches are also established in sev-
eral other European countries such as Sweden, the
Netherlands, Austria, and Poland [18, 19]. Hence, an as-
sessment of the relation of benefits of a new compound
to costs seems necessary for the preparation of central-
ized price negotiations [11, 20, 21].
In the United States, no organization performs drug
assessments similar to those in Europe, although the
relevance of a comparative effectiveness research has in-
creased with the introduction of the American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act of 2009 [22].
Discounts in Germany are based on early benefit as-
sessment. Evaluations of the society’s willingness-to-pay
and the welfare maximizing price cap are not relevant
[15]. Of course, there is a high incentive for choosing the
negotiation solution before doing a health economic
evaluation. From a regulatory perspective, currently a
health economic assessment conducted by IQWiG may
only start the earliest 15 months after launch and might
take up to 3 years. During that time, the arbitration award
builds the foundation for reimbursement. From a scien-
tific as well as pragmatic point of view, that implies a
loss of producer surplus and patient benefits. When a
manufacturer is presenting a new drug with additional
benefit, he does not need a cost-benefit-assessment. If
the new drug has no additional benefit, a cost-benefit-
assessment would not change anything as per current
regulations. If a manufacturer decides to provide cost-
effectiveness results with the dossier, the GBA will cer-
tainly ignore that based on formal grounds. The GBA
stated for the Ticagrelor case, that any cost offset that
lower incremental costs of Ticagrelor should be dis-
cussed in the negotiation with the GKV-SV or could be
become relevant in a cost-benefit analysis that any party
can ask for post arbitration [23, 24].
Manufacturers value this process in a different
way. On the one hand, incentives for the develop-
ment of innovative drugs could be lower due to
(sometimes misleading) assessments. One year after
launch, they are no longer able to achieve monopol-
istic prices for their innovative products. On the
other hand, when negotiating individual discounts it
is possible to focus on individual product properties
so that the final discount prevents the abuse of the
monopolistic position [25].
As a final point, the negotiation procedure ties up
public resources and may lead to overwhelming bureau-
cracy costs because of delayed negotiations and the in-
ability to find a price (when going to the arbitration
court). This raises the question what the real amount of
budget impact and cost savings is [26].
Conclusions
Negotiations alone seem not to be the appropriate way
to find a price optimum for new drugs. With the influ-
ence factors assessed in this study, the results are not
properly predictable. Each negotiation process starts
under new conditions. With respect to the negotiated
discounts, there is a potential risk that the aim of a mere
cost reduction becomes dominant with significant spill-
over effects worldwide.
Decision-analytic assessments might help to fill po-
tential gaps when planning different price strategies.
For that reason, cost-benefit-assessment might be an
essential tool for negotiations. Cost-benefit-assessments
conducted by the manufacturer and/or payer at the
time of dossier submission may help to give a first
impression about the adequacy of the true value for a
new drug.
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Appendix 1
Table 7 Results of the univariate regressiona (N = 193)
Predictor (X) n Beta SE Coeff (β) p-value R2
Additional benefit 100 −0.041 0.019 −0.156 0.030* 0.024
Major 1 −0.084 0.132 −0.046 0.527 0.002
Considerable 29 −0.015 0.027 −0.042 0.564 0.002
Minor 48 −0.014 0.022 −0.045 0.532 0.002
Non-quantifiable 22 −0.052 0.030 −0.127 0.078 0.016
No additional benefit 92 0.044 0.019 0.167 0.020* 0.028
Less benefit (additional harm potential) 1 −0.130 0.132 −0.071 0.324 0.005
Orphan status 29 −0.043 0.026 −0.117 0.104 0.014
Indication per category
Certain infectious and parasitic diseases 51 0.001 0.022 0.002 0.975 0.000
Diseases of the blood and blood-forming organs 2 0.026 0.094 0.020 0.784 0.000
Diseases of the circulatory system 14 0.035 0.036 0.070 0.332 0.005
Diseases of the digestive system 6 0.056 0.054 0.075 0.303 0.006
Diseases of the eye and adnexa 7 −0.026 0.051 −0.037 0.609 0.001
Diseases of the genitourinary system 2 −0.022 0.094 −0.017 0.816 0.000
Diseases of the musculoskeletal system and connective tissue 1 0.176 0.131 0.096 0.183 0.008
Diseases of the nervous system 9 0.167 0.043 0.268 0.000** 0.072
Diseases of the respiratory system 9 −0.095 0.044 −0.152 0.034* 0.023
Diseases of the skin and subcutaneous tissue 1 0.209 0.131 0.114 0.113 0.013
Endocrine, nutritional and metabolic diseases 24 −0.024 0.029 −0.060 0.403 0.004
Mental and behavioral disorders 2 0.038 0.094 0.029 0.689 0.001
Neoplasms 57 −0.028 0.021 −0.097 0.181 0.009
Other 8 −0.013 0.048 −0.020 0.787 0.000
Number of ACT >1 83 0.016 0.019 0.059 0.418 0.003
Incorporated HRQoL-data 49 −0.036 0.022 −0.119 0.100 0.014
Abbreviations: HRQoL health-related quality of life, Beta standardized coefficient, SE standard error, Coeff coefficient, R2 coefficient of determination
** Significant at the 0.01 level
* Significant at the 0.05 level
a Dependent Variable (Y): price change (discount)
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Appendix 2
Table 8 Summary of the multivariate regression
Model Summarya
R R2 R2 corr SE
0.404a 0.163 0.076 0.1262671
ANOVAa
SS df MS F p-value
Regression 0.540 18 0.030 1.882 0.020*
Residual 2.774 174 0.016 – –
Total 3.314 192 – – –
Coefficientsa
Predictors (X) Beta SE Coeff (β) p-value
(constant) 0.228 0.021 0.000
Major benefit −0.102 0.135 −0.056 0.451
Considerable benefit −0.033 0.029 −0.091 0.249
Minor benefit −0.029 0.024 −0.094 0.228
Non-quantifiable benefit –0.060 0.031 –0.147 0.055
Less benefit –0.138 0.128 –0.076 0.282
Diseases of the digestive system 0.061 0.055 0.080 0.270
Diseases of the genitourinary system –0.002 0.093 –0.001 0.984
Endocrine, nutritional and metabolic diseases –0.017 0.032 –0.042 0.608
Other 0.010 0.051 0.016 0.839
Diseases of the nervous system 0.156 0.047 0.252 0.001**
Diseases of the musculoskeletal system and connective tissue 0.199 0.129 0.109 0.124
Certain infectious and parasitic diseases 0.013 0.025 0.043 0.604
Diseases of the circulatory system 0.043 0.038 0.085 0.264
Diseases of the skin and subcutaneous tissue 0.199 0.128 0.109 0.122
Diseases of the blood and blood-forming organs 0.017 0.092 0.013 0.856
Diseases of the eye and adnexa –0.029 0.052 –0.041 0.575
Diseases of the respiratory system –0.086 0.046 –0.138 0.064
Mental and behavioural disorders 0.028 0.092 0.022 0.757
Predictors “Neoplasms” and “No additional benefit” automatically excluded from the model
Abbreviations: Beta standardized coefficient; df degrees of freedom; MS mean squares (SS/dfs); F F statistic; R correlation coefficient; R2 coefficient of determination;
R2 corr coefficient of determination corrected; SE standard error; SS sums of squares
** Significant at the 0.01 level
* Significant at the 0.05 level
a Dependent Variable (Y): price change (discount)
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